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STUART G. TIPTON,

EMBEZZLEMENT

-

FRAUDULENT

CONVERSION ny DIREcToR.-[Illinois]

Ernest J. Stevens, vice president of
the Illinois Life Insurance Company,
was indicted with his father and
brother, also directors of the life insurance company, for embezzlement
under Section 75 of the Illinois
Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.
(Smith--Turd, 1933) c. 38, §208)
"If any officer
which provides:
. . . of any incorporated company
. . . embezzles or fraudulently converts to his own use . . . without
the consent of his company . .
any property of such company . . .
he shall be deemed guilty of larThe defendant was conceny."
victed by the Criminal Court of
Cook County. Held: on appeal, reversed. The People had failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
felonious intent of the defendant to
convert the money and bonds to his
own use: People v. Stevens (Ill.
1934) 193 N. E. 154.
The defendant and other members
of the Stevens family owned 37,600
shares, of the 40,000 shares outstanding of the life insurance company. The life insurance company
owned one-half the general mortgage 7 per cent sinking fund bonds
of the Stevens Hotel Company, the
defendant owned $250,000 of these
bonds, and the Stevens family
owned four-fifths of the common
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stock of the hotel company. The
transactions which gave rise to the
offense charged were several loans
made by the life insurance company,
acting through its finance committee of which defendant was a member, to the hotel company, and the
sale by the insurance company to
the hotel company of bonds, in return for which the hotel company
gave its corporate notes. The theory
of the state was that at the time of
these loans the hotel company was
insolvent, that the defendant, his
father and brother knew of this insolvency, and since they owned a
large portion of the stock of the
hotel company, the making of such
loans was to convert the money to
the use of the defendant.
An examination of the statute
under which the indictment was
drawn raises the question as to
whether the defendant can he said to
have converted the property to his
own use within the meaning of the
statute. Although a literal construction would demand that the conversion be for the direct benefit of
the defendant, it has been held
under such a statute to be imniaterial whether the conversion was
for his personal advantage or not,
State v. Ross (1909) 55 Ore. 450,
104 Pac. 596, and that a person
could convert money to his own use
by mingling it with the funds of an
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insolvent corporation of which he is
a stockholder and officer, Milbrath
v. State (1909) 138 Wis. 354, 120
N. W. 252. Although doubtful, this
construction seems to have been assumed in the principal case.
The second element of the offense
as defined in the statute is that the
conversion by the officer must be
without the consent of the principal:
People v. Parker (1934) 355 I1. 258.
189 N. E. 352. Under the charter of
the insurance company it had the
power to make loans to the hotel
company, the loans were authorized
by the finance committee, and later
approved and ratified by the board
of directors of the life insurance
company, so the loans could not be
said to be without the consent of
the insurance company. Cf. People
v. Burnham (1907) 104 N. Y. Supp.
725, 119 App. Div. 302; 106 N. Y.
Supp. 57, 120 App. Div. 338.
Although this defect in the indictment would seem to be sufficient to
reverse the case the court rested its
reversal for the most part upon the
failure of proof of felonious intent
which was said to be necessary to
sustain a conviction of embezzlement: People v. Ervin (1930) 342
Ill. 421, 174 N. E. 529; Ridge v.
State (1923) 192 Ind. 139, 137 N.
E. 758. To establish this intent the
prosecution attempted to prove that
the hotel company was insolvent at
the time the loans were made: Agar
v. State (1911) 176 Ind. 234, 94 N.
E. 819. This was the foundation
of the state's case; without proof of
insolvency it must fail. Two witnesses were presented to prove the
value of the assets of the hotel company. The first witness testified that
his opinion as to the value was based
upon calculations as to the cash
market value of the hotel property,
its economic life, and average occupancy. The second witness arrived

at his evaluation by making an estimate of the financial possibilities of
the hotel during the remainder of
its economic life, based upon past
performances during that time and
general conditions in Chicago. The
Supreme Court held this testimony
incompetent and thereby defeated
the prosecution. This is in conformity with prior Illinois decisions
where in prosecutions for receiving
bank deposits while insolvent the
court has held opinion evidence as
to insolvency was inadmissible:
People v. Gould (1931) 345 Ill. 228,
178 N. E. 133; Peop!e v. Clark
(1928) 329 11. 104, 160 N. E. 233.
However, other jurisdictions have
held opinion evidence is admissible
to prove insolvency provided the
witness is properly qualified and the
facts are shown upon which his
opinion is founded:
Bennett v.
American Bank & Trust Co. (1926)
162 Ga. 718, 134 S. E. 781; S!awe v.
Gregory (1924) 198 Iowa 316. 198
N. W. 58; Freeman v. State (1915)
108 Miss. 818, 67 So. 460. The term
"insolvent" is subject to two common definitions.
Under statutes
prohibiting the transfer of corporate
property while insolvent, the term
has been held to mean the inability
of the debtor to pay current liabilities as they mature: Hoa,;dand v.
U. S. Trust Co. (1932) 110 N. J.
Eq. 489, 160 At]. 652: Behre,:s v.
Clark (1928) 227 N. Y. Supp. 717,
131 Misc. Rep. 712. But in criminal
prosecutions for receiving bank deposits while insolvent, the term is
held to mean that the cash value of
assets realizable in a reasonable time
is not equal to liabilities, exclusive
of capital stock: People v. Clark
(1928) 329 111. 104, 160 N. E. 233.
To prox e criminal intent necessary
to support the charge of embezzlerent in the principal case, the court
said it would have been necessary.
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to prove insolvency in the latter
sense. To use the former definition
of insolvency might impose criminal liability on a person who in the
utmost good faith has attempted to
preserve a business in which he has
confidence.
From this analysis it is evident
that 'he present embezzlement statute is insufficient to cope with this
situation. If the state desires to
place criminal liability upon the officer of a corporation who approves a
loan to another corporation of
which he is also a director at a time
when the borrower is insolvent,
further legislation is necessary.
WILL T. WRIGHT.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AS MEANS

or REVIEWING STATE CRIMINAL
This was a
TRIALS.-[Federal]

proceeding before the Supreme
Court of the United States on the
application of Thomas J. Mooney
for leave to file a petition for an
oriqinal writ of habeas corpus
against the warden of San Quentin
Penitentiary. The petitioner had
been held by the State of California
upon a conviction of murder. He
charged that the state held him in
confinement without due process of
law in that his conviction had been
procured by perjured testimony,
used by the prosecutor with knowledgqe that it was perjured. The Attorney General of the state responded by way of demurrer insisting that no federal question was
raised. Held: leave to file petition
denied, without prejudice. The use
of testimony by a prosecutor with
knowledge that it was perjured is
a denial of due process of law for
which the court would allow a writ
of habeas corpus, hut such relief
cannot be granted until the dcfendart has exhausted his remedies in

the state court: Mooney v. Holohart (1935) 55 S. Ct. :4U.
A procedural question arises in
this case. The petitioner had been
denied relief in both the lower district court, (D. C. Cal. 1934) 7 F.
Supp. 385, and the Circuit Court of
Appeals, In re looney (C. C. A.
9th, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 503, and instead of taking his appeal or applying for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court: 43 Stat. 936, 28 U.
S. C. A. §347 (1925), he abandoned
those proceedings and sought an
oriqinal writ from the Supreme
Court. In effect, he took a direct
route from the highest court of the
state to the Supreme Court, complainbig of the order of the state
court affirming his conviction. This
particular procedure seems novel in
federal practice for although the
Supreme Court has in the past
taken jurisdiction upon petitions for
original writs, the cases have been
those in which the lower federal
district court had made the order
which was alleged to have deprived
the party of his constitutional
rights: In re Sawyer (1888) 124
U. S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482; Ex parte
Terry (1888) 128 U. S. 289, 9 S.
Ct. 77; Ex parte Bollman (1807)
12 U. S. 75; Ex parte Siebold
(1879) 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte
Grossman (1925) 267 U. S. 87, 45
S. Ct. 332; and many other cases a
collection of which may be found
in 28 U. S. C. A. §251. There is
no fault to be fbund with this procedure, however, for although the
application here is for an original
writ, it cannot be said that the court
is exercising original jurisdiction
(which we know to he limited to
the exclusion of this particular situation by the Constitution of the
United States. Article 11, §2). It
was early decide(d in oir courts that
jurisdiction over an original writ of
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habeas corpus is appellate jurisdiction for if granted it operates only
to "revise" a proceeding already instituted: Ex parte Watkins (1830)
35 U. S. 193. This construction
though strained enough in the ordinary habeas corpus case is especially so here since it will require
a consideration of matters necessarily extrinsic to the entire case;
i. e., perjured testimony. But an
inquiry into perjured testimony
might seem to be within the criterion of "revises" as stated in Ex
parte Watkins, supra.
In considering the merits of the
principal case, the court practically
promised to give the petitioner relief if he fails in the state courts.
Therefore the question arises as to
how far the decision operates to
allow review of state criminal trials
by the Supreme Court through the
writ of habeas corpus. The federal
courts have taken jurisdiction in
these cases through the Revised
Statutes, §753, 28 U. S. C. A. §753
(1927) where it is stated that "the
writ of habeas corpus shall in no
case extend to a prisoner in jail
unless . . . where he . . . (3)

is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the
United States

.

.

."

This ap-

plies to both state and federal custody and a majority of all federal
habeas corpus cases probably are
brought under it: Dobie, "Federal
Procedure" (1928) pp. 304, 305. But
it is well established that the writ
can only be used to look into the
matter of jurisdiction; and even
then it is issued only in cases of
great hardship and where substantial justice so requires: In re
Savage (1890) 134 U. S. 176, 10 S.
Ct. 389; Dobie, supra, p. 306.
Holmes, J., has expressed the whole
matter in the following pithy sentence. "This proceeding is not a fox

hunt": Kelly v. Griffen (1916) 241
U. S. 6, 36 S. Ct. 487. Wherever
the writ has been granted, however,
under this section of the statute, the
theory has been that the defendant
was denied due process of law and
that the court below therefore had
no jurisdiction of the case: Frank
v. Magnum (1915) 237 U. S. 6, 36
S. Ct. 487; Moore v. Dempsey
(1923) 261 U. S. 104, 43 S. Ct.
265; Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287
U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55; see statutes
supra.
Frank v. Magnum, supra, and
Moore v. Dempsey, supra, were
cases similar to the principal case
in that they marked an extension of
due process as employed in this connection. Those decisions held that
a trial dominated by mob violence
was proscribed by the due process
clause. Powell v. Alabama, supra,
coming a few years later, added another right to those above, i. e., the
right to be represented by competent counsel. After those decisions
many apprehensive commentators
predicted dire results, effects which
may as well be expected to result
from the decision in the principal
case. They feared (1) unprecedented invasion of state criminal
procedure and serious inroads on
state sovereignty, (2) delay added
to administration of justice and (3)
an added burden on an already
overworked Supreme Court. But
these fears have not materialized.
To the first it is sufficient to say
that attempts to procure the relief
had in the above cases have been
defeated in many subsequent cases:
Bard v. Chilton (C. C. A. 6th, 1927)
20 F. (2d) 906, cert. den. (1925)
270 U. S. 565; Dunn v. Lyons (C.
C. A. 5th, 1927) 23 F. (2d) 14,
cert. den. (1922) 276 U. S. 622;
Ashe v. United Stqtes (1926) 270
U. S. 424, 46 S. Ct. 334 (with ]an-
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guage showing the clear intention
of the court to deny such relief).
The second question may be answered by noting that delays arc
inevitable under a form of jurisprudence where the accused is "innocent until proved guilty." As to
the third, a substitution of the writ
of grace (certiorari) for the writ of
right (error) has already lightened
the work of that court and it is always a means of diminishing its
work. Since habeas corpus is also,
in a limited sense, a writ of grace,
no such fear is valid in this specific
instance.
The principal case presents another example of the well known
method of the Supreme Court in
defining due process by the test of
inclusion and exclusion. The right
to a trial free from perjured testimony has been 'added to those vindicated by the Frank, Moore and
Powell cases. Does this particular
case justify fears of federal encroachment over state criminal matters ? An excerpt from Dobie,
supra, p. 308, has a good statement
of an obvious answer: "It is believed that federal habeas corpus
in cases of state custody has done
more good than harm. If the lower
federal courts employ the writ in
the spirit manifested by the Supreme Court-if they use it, as a
famous English painter once ,;ald
he mixed his paints 'with brains'there seems to be no very serious
grounds for alarm, even on the part
of extreme protagonists of state immunity from federal interference."
The principal case may be another striking illustration of the
molding of judicial opinion by nonjudicial factors. See Cardozo "The
Nature of the Judicial Process"
(1923) p. 12. What these may be
are purely conjectural, at best. but
some elements seem to be clear.

That the Mooney case has been a
matter of political maneuvering in
California for many years is common knowledge. It is clear that the
Supreme Court of that state has
closed every avenue of escape to the
defendant with the exception of
that here suggested, i. e., habeas
corpus from the state's highest
court. Though under the California
Penal
Code
((Deering,
1931)
§§1473-1506) the petitioner may
procure a hearing on his motion for
leave to file the writ, he must still
convince the court that his claims
are well founded. It is only necessary to read the four decisions
handed down by the California Supreme Court to be convinced that
this will be more easily said than
done: People v. Moonel, (1917)
175 Cal. 666, 166 Pac. 999; (1917)
176 Cal. 105, 167 Pac. 696; (1918)
177 Cal. 642, 171 Pac. 690; (1918)
178 Cal. 525, 174 Pac. 325. Assuming that no relief be had from
that source it can scarcely be supposed that the governor of that
state will render him a full pardon
when every prior governor, who has
considered his case, has refused to
set him free. Therefore, it may be
that behind the picture is a desire to
set the petitioner free through judicial processes of the federal government and thereby indirectly remove a source of continual irritation to the people and courts of the
State of California and at the same
time preserve the integrity of its
criminal procedure. At any rate,
the method here used is dangerous
in that it may be misinterpreted to
mean, as it has been done by many,
that the Supreme Court is beginning to encroach unon the right of
a state to be the final judge in its
own criminal trials.
RAYMOND

NAJA.RIAN.
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JU-

DICIARY TO MAKE RULES-TRIAL BY

The defendants
JuRy.-[Illinois]
were convicted of robbery with a
gun and appealed, assigning error
in that the trial judge had commented on the weight of the evidence. Rule 27 passed by the Supreme Court to govern procedure in
criminal cases adopted the mode of
instruction for jury trials as set out
in the Illinois Civil Practice Act of
1933 for civil cases and in effect
forbade the trial judge to express
any opinion on the weight of the
evidence. The validity of Rule 27
was attacked on the ground that the
Supreme Court had been given no
authority by the. Civil Practice Act
to formulate rules of procedure for
the Criminal Court and further that
it violated the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury. Held: on
appeal, reversed. In the absence
of legislative enactments upon the
subject the Suprerme Court has inherent power to formulate rules ot
procedure governing the practice of
inferior courts. Rule 27 restricting
the power of the trial court to comment on the weight of the evidence
is not unconstitutional as violating
the right of trial by jury: People
v. Callopy (Illinois 1934) 192 N.
E. 634.
The decision regarding the power
of the court to promulgate rules of
practice is the embodiment of much
that leading members of the legal
profession have been strenuously
advocating for a number of years.
The abuses present in the judicial
system and the delays of the law
have been considered as resulting
in some measure from the faulty
system of practice enacted in code
form by the various state legislatures and the remedy suggested
was that the courts be given the
power to formulate rules. It has

been felt that the needs of lawyers
and clients are better known to
judges who are in constant contact
with litigants than to legislators
who are not conversant with problems of judicial administration.
"Report of the Committee of the
Conference of Bar Association
Delegates" (1927) 13 A. B. A. J.
2; Morgan, "Judicial Regulation of
Court Procedure" (1917) 2 Minn.
L. Rev. 81. Paul, "The Rule-Making Power of the Courts" (1925)
1 Wash. L. Rev. 163.
In this country, however, the enactment of rules of procedure has
nearly always been considered as a
subject properly within the legislative domain. The explanation of
this attitude is accounted for by the
fact that the 19th Century revolution in procedure took place at a
time when the legislature was in the
ascendancy and, zealous in the exercise of its newly acquired sovereignty, took the lead in all things.
Further the common law lawyers of
the time were essentially procedural technicians who thought primarily in terms of procedure rather
than substance. Because of the consequent lassitude of the bar the task
of reform was relegated to the legislature: Pound, "The Rule Making Power of the Courts" (1926)
12 A. B. A. J. 599. The first code
enacted by any legislature was the
Field Code for New York passed
in 1848. Starting with 400 sections
it soon grew enormously and proved
so cumbersome and inflexible that
it was condemned by all advocates
of procedural reform. Nevertheless
the Field Code became the model
for a great many state legislatures
whose power to enact rules of procedure went unchallenged.
In England on the other hand the
courts always m aintained their
power to make rules of practice.
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When in 1833 rules of court had become undesirably complex Parliament authorized the courts to formulate more liberal rules and under
this authorization the. courts promulgated the Hilary Rules of 1834
simplifying practice. In 1873 the
Judicature Act provided for a definite committee to make rules of procedure and this committee, consisting of lawyers, barristers, solicitors
and justices of the several courts,
exists with various modifications to
the present day. So well has this
system operated that it has been regarded as superior to any codes of
practice existing in this country:
tFisher, "The Present Status of the
Rule Making Power in Wisconsin"
(1927) 17 Reports of the State Bar
Association of Wisconsin 217; Rosenbaum, "Studies in English Civil
Procedure" (1914) 63 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 154.
Influenced perhaps by the success
of the English system there is at
the present time an ever growing
tendency to delegate the procedural
details of the administration of justice to the courts. A number of
state courts now possess power to
make rules of procedure either by
constitutional provisions so authorizing them or by legislative delegations of power. Paid, "American
Recognition of the Rule Making
Power" (1926) 6 Ore. L. Rev. 51.
In confornity with the present trend
tlie Federal -Supreme Court's power
to make rules has been extended to
authorize the making of rules for
inferior courts in actions at law:
28 U. S. C. A. §§ 7 2 3b,723c (1934)..
Both state and federal courts have
held such delegations of power to
be constitutional, holding that the
power to make rules is not exclusively a legislative function but one
also judicial in nature and may
therefore be delegated to the

courts: In re Conslitutionality of
Wisconsin Statute (1931) 204 Wis.
501, 236 N. W. 717; Wayman v.
Soulhard (1825) 23 U. S. 1.
In the present case the notion
that the -ourt had inherent power
to formulate rules without a legislative delegation of power was
based ultimately upon Section 1,
Article 3 of the Constitution of
1870 which granted to the Supreme
Court all power judicial in nature.
To ascertain the bounds of such
power it was necessary to resort*
to the common law as it existed
at the time of the adoption of
the constitution. Resorting thus to
the common law there can be no
doubt that the King's Bench as it
existed in England at that time
formulated rules of procedure for
its own use as well as for the use
of the nisi prius courts: Pound,
"Regulation of Judicial Procedure"
(1915) 10 111. L. Rev. 171. The
Illinois Supreme Court then stated
that since it corresponded to the
King's Bench and since the latter
court had rule making power over
the nisi prits courts the Illinois
court had such power over the
Criminal Court. This analysis is
questionable for even if it be assumed that the Supreme Court corresponds to the King's Bench the
Criminal Court does not bear a corresponding relationship to the nisi
prii:s ciourts.
These latter courts
were mere agencies of the KivZ's
Bench. Cases begun in ihe King's
Bench were sent to he heard by the
various nisi prils judges of the
county in which the action criginated. Nisi prils jndges represented for all purposes the King's
Bench and a trial at n-isi prius was
in all respects equivalent to a trial
before the full bench: I Holdsworth, "History of the English
Law" (3,. ed. 1922) pp. 276, 28i.
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The Criminal Court of Cook County
on the other hand is a constitutional
court endowed with defined judicial
power and by no means subject to
the same measure of control by the
Supreme Court of Illinois that the
King's Bench exercised over the
nisi prius courts. Nevertheless the
decision in the present case is a desirable one and opens the door for
procedural reforms.
Because it prohibited the trial
court from commenting on the
weight of the evidence, Rule 27 was
also attacked on the ground that it
deprived a defendant of a trial by
jury. The Constitution of 1870
guarantees that the right of trial
by jury "as heretofore enjoyed"
shall remain inviolate: Article 2
Section 5. In construing the phrase
in the absence of any legislative
definition the court must have recourse to the common law to ascertain the essential incident of trial
by jury as they then existed: People v. Bruner (1931) 343 Ill. 146,
175 N. E. 400. It had heretofore
been decided in People v. Kelly
(1931) 347 II1. 221, 179 N. E. 898,
that Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act of 1907 (which has since
been repealed by the Civil Practice
Act of 1933) forbidding the court
to comment on the weight of the
evidence, did not violate the constitutional guarantee of trial by
jury. It was there held that the
power to comment on the evidence
was a mere procedural detail of the
trial and not an essential element
and only the essential elements of
trial by jury were said to be protected by the constitution. However, a survey of the authorities
shows quite plainly that at common law, as it existed in England,
the trial court had power to comment on the weight of the evidence
if it was made clear to the jury
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that his comments were not binding; indeed it was considered as of
the very essence of trial by jury:
Hale, "History of the Common Law
of England" (4th ed. 1792) p. 291;
3 Blackstone,-"Commentaries on the
Laws of England" (Wendall's ed.
1847) p. 374; Nudd v. Barrows
(1875) 91 U. S. 426. Thayer, "Preliminary Treatise on the Law of
Evidence" (1898) p. 187. In People
v. Callopy, supra, however, in determining the constitutionality of Rule
27 (which was in effect a restatement of Section 72) the court had
recourse to the common law of
Virginia to ascertain the essential
elements of trial by jury as they
there existed.
In Virginia the
courts had never sanctioned the
practice of commenting on the
weight of the evidence. The court
justified its resort to the common
law of Virginia on the ground that
Illinois had once been a part of
that state, and also relied upon the
Illinois case of Sinopoli v. Chicago
Railways Co. (1925) 316 Ill. 609,
147 N. E. 487. There the court had
stated that the right to trial by jury
was the right as known in Illinois
at the time of the adoption of the
constitution and prior thereto in
Virginia. The court in the Sinopoli
case had however immediately
quoted with approval from the case
of Geoige v. People (1897) 167 Ill.
447, 47 N. E. 741, to the effect that
the common law of England afforded the basis for determining
the essentials of trial by jury. In
the present case in construing away
the effect of the English common
law the court did not state that the
right to comment on the evidence
was a mere procedural detail of trial
by jury. Instead the court relied on
the case of Penny v. Little (1841)
3 Scam. 301, wherein it had been
stated that subsequent modifications
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of the common law by the colonists
themselves, which laws were more
applicable to our present conditions
and habits, should supersede the
English law. This view is entirely
acceptable but has no application
here for the power to comment oil
the evidence having been assumed
by the federal courts as well as by
a number of state courts must be
considered as entirely in conformance with our present conditions
and habits. Unless the court states
that the right to comment on the
evidence was not an essential part
of trial by jury in English law the
statute incorporating the common
law of England as part of our own
law would seem to be of controlling
force.
The present tendency in this
country is in favor of restoring to
the courts the power to comment
on the weight of evidence. The
inefficiency of the jury has been
regarded as due in large measure to
the fact that an inexperienced body
of men has been deprived of the
opinion of a trained judge. Sunderland, "Inefficiency of the Jury"
(1914) 13 Mich. L. Rev. 302. By
its stand on this point the Supreme
Court has adopted a more conservative and perhaps less desirable point
of view. However, by its decision
regarding the power of the court
to make rules of practice it has alleviated at least one of the evils
present in the judicial system.
DANIEL A. PANTER.

ILLEGAL
OFFICER

ENTRAPMENT
IN

SALE

OF

BY POLICE
UNLAWFUL

The apVWIIAvoTNs-[California]
pellant was charged and convicted
of the unlawful selling of "billies"
contrary to the statute. One Fort,
acting on the instructions of the
police department of Oakland, went

to the defendants place of business
and told him he was employed on
a certain boat, and had been directed to the store by a friend, for
the purpose of buying a dozen
blackjacks from the defendant.
The defendant said he would obtain them later and Fort returned
anc4 paid him $1.50 each for three
"billies." While Fort was in the
store with the defendant, the police
entered and arrested them. The
defendant was convicted in the
lower court. Held: on appeal, reversed (one justice dissenting).
Although decoys may be used to
trap criminals and present an opportunity for one intending a crime,
an officer of the law cannot create
the intent in his own mind to commit the crime and then ensnare and
induce innocent persons into committing the crime: People v. Makovsky (Cal. 1934) 36 P. (2d) 118.
The defendant in this case contended that this act of Fort constituted an illegal entrapment which
was prompted by persuasion, deceitful representations to induce and
lure him into a crime that originated in the mind of the police
officers. This, of course, is illegal
and many cases have decided similar fact situations in this manner.
The court here relied primarily on
the case of People v. Malonc (1930)
117 Cal. App. 629, 4 P. (2d) 287.
It said in this case, "It may be conceded that when an officer induces
a person to commit a crime which
he would not have done without
such inducement, the law will not
punish the person so lured into the
crime, but this is only true where
the intent originates with the officer, and where the defendant is
induced to commit a crime which
was not contemplated by him." See
People v. Tomasovich (1922) 56
Cal. App. 520, 206 Pac. 119; Peo-
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ple v. Norcross (1925) 71 Cal. App.
2, 234 Pac. 438. In the case of
Butts v. United States (C. C. A.
8th, 1921) 273 Fed. 35, the court
said, "The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent,
not to punish crime. It is not their
duty to incite to and create crime
for the sole purpose of prosecuting
and punishing it." See Goode v.
United States (1895) 159 U. S.
604, 15 S. Ct. 136; Grimsom v.
United States (1894) 156 U. S. 604,
15 S. Ct. 470; Frunkin v. United
States (C. C. A. 9th, 1920) 265
Fed. 1; Smith v. United States (C.
C. A. 8th, 1922) 284 Fed. 673;
Robinson v. United States (C. C.
A. 8th, 1928) 32 F. (2d) 505.
The prosecution contended that
this case was analogous to cases
involving entrapment in sale of
liquor and narcotics, where it has
been universally held that defense
of entrapment does not preclude a
conviction: In re Moore (1925) 70
Cal. App. 483, 233 Pac. 805; People
v. Rainirez (1928) 95 Cal. App. 140,
272 Pac. 608; People v. Heusers
(1922) 58 Cal. App. 103, 207 Pac.
908; People v. Barkdoll (1918) 36
Cal. App. 25, 171 Pac. 440; People
V. Tomasovich (1922) 56 Cal. App.
520, 206 Pac. 119. The majority
opinion of the court distinguished
these cases by pointing out, "There
is no objection to such acts as they
merely give the supposed offenders
an opportunity to sell, and there is
no unlawful entrapment.
Here,
however (in the present case) the
scheme originated in the minds of
the officers, and appellant so far as
the record shows was not engaged
in selling the instruments involved,
nor was he ever suspected of doing
so. The officers deliberately planned
a scheme to cause or influence appellant to commit a crime so they
might arrest and punish him." The
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majority thereforo turns the case
on the fact that the intent to commit the crime originated in the
minds of the officers and that the
defendant was an innocent victim
of their deceit and misrepresentation.
The manner in which the majority distinguished the cases dealing
with the illegal sale of liquor does
not seem very forceful.
Many
federal cases have held that where
the officers offered the opportunity
for the sale of the liquor, and the
accused accepted this did not constitute
entrapment:
Jordan v.
United States (C. C. A. 5th, 1924)
2 F. (2d) 598; Porter v. United
States (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) 31 F.
(2d) 544; Hadley v. United States
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927) 18 F. (2d)
507; United States v. Smith (D. C.
Tex. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 173; Note
(1932) 23 J. of Crim. Law 482. In
this case, as shown by the evidence
brought out in the dissentihg opinion, the defendant had been engaged in this business for a period
of ten years, and when he was offered the opportunity, he willingly
participated, although he knew he
was breaking the law, as was revealed by a statement lie made to
Fort. Therefore it seems that the
case falls clearly into the same class
as liquor law violations.
The dissenting Justice Knight, upholds the contention of the prosecution in a very able opinion. He
points out that if this had been a
burglary or robbery case the alleged
fact that the design to commit the
crime arose in the officer's mind and
that by inducements he was enticed
into the enterprise, the defense of
illegal entrapment would -have been
valid. However, this case came
tinder a different class of cases
which under the authorities should
be governed by a different rnle. It
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is a case wherein the accused is
charged with having illegally possessed and sold certain articles, the
possession and sale of which was
forbidden' by law, and is unquestionablyain the class of cases cited
above dealing with convictions for
selling intoxicating liquor and narcotics. After reviewing these cases,
it is noticed that this defense of entrapment in the principal case is
much weaker than many that have
been overruled in these liquor selling cases, particularly the Moore
case supra. Mr. Justice Knight's
arguments in the light of the evidence seems much more convincing.
In reversing this case on the
ground of illegal entrapment it
seems that the majority opinion
overlooks the precedent of previous
similar cases and puts undue weight
on the idea of intent to commit the
crime arising in the mind of the
officer and fails to give sufficient
weight to the fact that the accused
sold and possessed illegal weapons
and that he had been in such business for a number of years. To
eradicate this evil was fundamentally
the purpose of the statute. In a
discussion of a similar case in 23
J. of Crim. Law 483 the author
pointed out that the "'Origin of
the criminal intent' in whole or in
part as a formula would be difficult
to use in trying to allocate the time
and portion of the criminal intent
supplied by the defendant or the entrapping
government
officials."
However, this is the formula the
majority used, and it would then
unquestionably become a question
of fact, and one for a jury to decide. The jury in the principal case
after hearing all, of the evidence
decided against the defendant. Yet,
as was pointed out by the dissenting opinion, the majority of the
court overruled the finding of the
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jury on the evidence in the case
and supplemented their own.
WILLIAM G. KARNES.
THE HAUPTMANN TRIAL-THE
CASE FOR THE STATE.-In this most

publicized and expensive of modern
trials the presentation of the state's
case consumed sixteen court days
during which eighty-seven witnesses were placed on the stand and
two hundred and forty-seven exhibits were offered in evidence.
The controlling figure in the maneuvering of this mass of evidence was
Attorney General David T. Wilentz. In his opening statement Wilentz charged Hauptmann with the
murder of the Lindbergh baby
while attempting to take the child
from his nursery. After the defense motion for a mistrial because
of his inflammatory remarks had
been overruled. Wilentz put Colonel
Lindbergh's engineer on the stand
to explain the locale of the crime
to the jury. After this preliminary
matter had been disposed of the
state's case divided itself into four
phases: that establishing the facts
of the kidnapping and the payment
of the, ransom money to Hauptmann; that aimed at showing Hauptmann wrote the ransom notes; that
setting up the corpus delicti and the
capture of Hauptmann; and that
attempting to point out a motive for
Hauptmann's commission of the
crime.
In the first phase of the state's
case, Mrs. Lindbergh was called to
relate what happened in her home
on the night of the crime. Colonel
Lindbergh repeated that tale, identified the fourteen ransom notes received by him and Dr. Condon, and
swore that it was Hauptmann's
voice he had heard calling Dr. Condon in the cemetery on the night
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the ransom money was paid. Next men writings. One of the experts
a taxicab driver identified Haupt- said that he had previously exammann as the man who gave him a ined over eight thousand suspected
ransom note to deliver to Dr. Con- writings without finding the similarities required to connect the susdon, and a native of Hopewell
swore that he saw Hauptmann driv- pected person with the writer of the
ing near there on the day of the notes. A United States Internal
kidnapping. To explain the state's Revenue investigator was put on the
failure to offer finger print identi- stand during this handwriting testification, an expert was then brought mony to identify the $14,600 found
in to swear that no finger prints in Hauptmann's garage as part of
could be found in the nursery or on the ransom money. This testimony
the ladder, and as the last step in was a welcome relief from the
this phase Dr. Condon told of his monotony of the experts' testimony
and also served to bolster up their
conversation with the kidnapper in
the cemetery, the payment of the testimony since it showed Hauptmann had been found in possession
ransom money, and swore that
Hauptmann was the one to whom of the money demanded in the notes.
On cross-examination all the exhe had paid the money.
Thus far the fact of the kidnap- perts agreed that even a clever
ping and the payment of the ran- forger could not have concealed his
som had been established, and own writing by copying HauptHauptmann had been well identi- mann's, since many discrepancies
fied as the one who received the would have appeared among the
fourteen notes, even if one or two
ransom money from Dr. Condon.
have
been
successfully
The second phase of the case was might
monopolized by the handwriting ex- forged.
In the third phase, the jury was
perts, eight in all, who were brought
in to prove Hauptmann's connec- told how the body of the child had
tion with the ransom notes. Speci- been found bearing the hair and
inens of Hauptmann's writing were clothing which Colonel and Mrs.
admitted without objection and all Lindbergh had earlier identified as
that of their son. The coroner was
eight experts (their qualifications,
put on to show that the child had
as such, were not questioned)
died of a skull fracture on the night
agreed that there was a sufficient
volume of his writing to form an of the kidnapping, a blood clot in
the brain showing that the child was
opinion. After showing that the
language used, the peculiar spelling alive when the blow was given.
of words, like "boad" for "boat,"
After the corpus delicti had been
and the signs on the corner of each thus established, the details of
note connected all of the fourteen Hauptmann's capture were given to
notes, the experts testified that the the jury, including the finding in his
similarities between that writing and garage of $14,600 of the ransom
specimen
writing money, and the discovery of the
Hauptmann's
proved that he had written the ran- board containin.g Dr. Condon's telesom notes. For instance, of over
phone number. Thus far the prosethree hundred "i's" and "t's" in the cution had proved that the child had
notes, only five or six were prop- been kidnapped and killed, that
erly dotted and crossed. The same Hauptmann had been in possession
proportion held true in the speciof the ransom money when cap-
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tured, that he had written the ransom notes, and that he himself received payment of the ransom.
Finally, the motive which would
rationalize this net of circumstances,
all pointing toward Hauptmann, was
shown to be entirely mercenary.
This motive was established by
proof of his activities immediately
after the date of the ransom payment. He had quit his job at that
time, and six days later he opened
a new brokerage account, speculating to a greater extent after the
payment. His bank accounts were
also shown to the jury with the
damaging proof of large deposits in
silver coin since the ransom date.
implying that Hauptmann was
changing ransom notes for other
money. Another damaging witness
at this point was the cashier of a
movie house who identified Hauptmann as having passed a ransom
bill.
Saving the most telling blow till
the last, the prosecution called in
the wood expert as its last witness.
His qualifications were strongly
contested, but he was allowed to
testify that the ladder left on the
Lindbergh estate contained a board
which came from the Hauptmann
attic, that Hauptmann's plane was
used in making the ladder, and that
the ladder fitted into the car Hauptmann owned at the time of the kidnapping. Thus the jury were left
with a vivid realization that the
only two singular clues left at the
scene of the crime-the ransom note
and the ladder-placed Hauptmann there on the night of the kidnapping.
Faced at the outset with the impossibility of producing any direct
evidence against Hauptmann, the
prosecution had thus wound a net
of circumstantial evidence about
him mainly through the use of ex-

pert witnesses. The efficacy of this
method of attack was borne out by
the jury's verdict, but the case also
shows the main obstacle to the use
of expert witnesses. For it is estimated that $50,000 was needed to
produce the handwriting experts
and their charts, with another $10,000 going for the wood expert and
In addition, twentyhis work.
eight workers for the federal, state,
and New York city governments
spent $284,000 during the thirty
months they searched for clues,
while three hundred detectives of
the New York City Police Department spent $300,000 more attempting to produce the evidence finally
used by the experts to tie Hauptmann to this crime. As it took
another $8,000 to prepare the court
record, on rough estimates over
$650,000 was spent to complete the
Thus
case against Hauptmann.
reason is apparent why there are
so few convictions in similar cases
for it is not often that so much
money and time can be spent. The
national character of the victims of
the defendant undoubtedly explain
this exception to the rule.
It is to be noted that this comment is intended merely to summarize the significant points in the
case presented against Hauptmann,
as it is thought to be a good example
of efficient prosecution.
There is no intention to slight the
defense which probably was presented as well as could be expected
considering the lack of funds and
the unpopularity of that side of the
case. Two things seem to stand out
from this case which furnishes such
a wealth of material. One was the
testimony of the wood expert which
was unique, such testimony never
having been presented in court
before. Perhaps he was the forerunner of a vast array of experts
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who now may be expected to come
into court with their exact measurements, microscopic examinations
and photographic enlargements to
take their places along side of
fingerprint and hand writing experts. Shall we have leather experts, iron and steel experts, glass
experts, paint experts, hair experts
and soap experts? Another general impression of the case was men-

tioned by Paul H. Sanders in a recent number of the American Bar
Association Journal (XXI, p. 177)
-the case shows a decided advance
has been made in the detection and
pursuit of criminals and shows the
great advantage enjoyed by a centralized police agency not handicapped by state lines in such pursuit.
HENRY L.

MCINTYRE.

